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INTRODUCTION
This report summarizes the findings of a technical assessment 
mission performed by Frederick C. Cuny, an INTERTECT consultant for 
the Office of Contingency Planning & Crisis Management, Bureau of 
Refugee Affairs, Department of State.
Objectives
The objectives of the mission were:
A. to assist in the assessment of overall progress in providing 
humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon;
identify specific problems that still face the emergency 
assistance program;
C. to identify specific problems that may be encountered during the 
transition from emergency activities to more long-term programs;
D. to assist the Refugee Programs Office (RP) in assessing the 
quality of assistance to the refugees;
E. to assist in identification of lessons from the Lebanese opera­
tions that can help RP to expand emergency preparedness planning 
for future operations.
Site Visits
During this assessment the following refugee camps were visited:
Rashidiyah (Tyre): 85% destroyed
Burj ash-Shamali (Tyre): 15% destroyed
al-Buss (Tyre): 8% destroyed
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Ayn al-Hilwah (Sidon): 95% destroyed
Miyah-Miyah (Sidon): No Damage
Burj al-Barajinah (Beirut): 12% destroyed
Sabra (Beirut): 10% destroyed
Shatila (Beirut): 10% destroyed
Mar Elias (Beirut): 5% destroyed
Period of Performance
The assessment mission was conducted 7-15 December 1982. Due to 
the short time period involved, on-site verification of claims made 
or data provided by participating engineers was not entirely possi­
ble; thus the observations and analysis herein reflect only a quali­
tative and not a quantitative evaluation. Figures or statistics 
quoted are those provided by the agencies and were not developed by 
the consultant unless otherwise noted.
Disclaimer
The observations in this report are those of the consultant and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of State or 
Office of Refugee Programs.
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OVERALL OBSERVATIONS
A. Number of Refugees: In all camps in Sidon and Tyre, except
Rashidiyah*, the number of refugees and refugee families appears 
to be equal to or slightly more than the numbers developed by 
UNRWA. In Beirut, the number of refugees is difficult to esti­
mate but, due to the surrounding urban environment and ease of 
access and egress, the number is probably much greater than 
officially listed. However, these people are unlikely to be in 
need of assistance as they are being sheltered by friends and 
relatives.** Registration of Palestinians by UNRWA has always
*In Rashidiyah, the number of refugees is probably much less than 
official estimates. This is due to the distance from the city which 
makes people feel vulnerable and isolated from work. The level of 
self help reconstruction is far less than in other camps and it is 
estimated that many have left the camp to find work in Beirut.
**Many of the 1970 refugees are believed to have "gone to the north", 
to the Biqa' Valley and Tripoli. While some movement of fighters 
certainly took place (UNRWA now reports a 25% increase in camp 
population in the north), most displaced refugees are probably in the 
Beirut area. There are no reports of major overcrowding in the 
northern camps and no new camps are reported by volag sources in the 
area. Thus it should be anticipated that in future programs, the 
number of Palestinians in the Beirut area will probably increase 
substantially, especially if permission is obtained for 1970 refugees 
to remain. If such permission is not officially extended, large 
numbers will remain outside the UNRWA assistance system and aid 
programs will have to treat these people as "squatters" or illegal 
aliens .
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been a confusing issue due to UNRWA's continued use of the 1950 
registration system wherein families "not in need" were not 
registered. This has enabled people who both did and did not 
want to be counted for various purposes to do so. However, un­
registered refugees have been included by UNRWA where possible 
for determining program needs and the figures are probably as 
accurate as possible under the circumstances.
According to the UNRWA Deputy Director, the agency plans to 
change registration procedures in the near future. This move 
should be encouraged, but care must be taken to ensure that the 
new system is flexible and will permit those displaced and un­
willing or unable to register at present to obtain new documents 
in the future. No re-registration should proceed unless UNRWA 
has assurances that re—registration will not be used as a means 
of complicating protection and residency by the Government of 
Lebanon.
® * Difficulties Due to Politics and/or Security Considerations:
i* Assistance Program Operations. Overall the delivery of
assistance to refugees in the camps has not been seriously
Figure 1: Israeli Security Patrol in Ayn al-Hilwah
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hampered by security considerations. Individual concerns 
have arisen, of course, but in comparison to past opera­
tions, including those in Lebanon, agencies have not been 
overly delayed or hindered.
2. Politically-Related Difficulties. Uncertainty over long­
term asylum has prompted UNRWA and other agencies to act 
cautiously regarding various aspects of the assistance pro­
gram. Most affected is the physical reconstuction of the 
camps and the shelter program. First, UNRWA was prevented 
from obtaining or utilizing aerial photos of the camps that 
would have aided the engineering staff in developing plans 
or estimates of clearance requirements. While this work 
could have been done from ground surveys, aerials could 
have greatly speeded the work and provided a basis for land 
platting and subdivision. (As will be noted later, plat­
ting was not done until early December, and land ownership 
and resettlement are expected to be a major problem.)
Second, UNRWA has felt it necessary to move cautiously.
The agency initially attempted to provide tents as a tem­
porary shelter rather than help the refugees rebuild more 
permanent housing. (See Housing Section for further com­
ments .)
Another factor -that has contributed to slowing the pace of 
reconstruction is the absence of men. Many are in the 
north with the PLO or hiding out in other cities. Several 
thousand are in detention centers of the IDF, and many were 
evacuated during the disengagement. This has meant that 
most rebuilding must be carried out by older men and the 
women in the camps. Thus, the quality of housing construc­
tion and repair is even worse than usual and is much slower
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in comparison with other operations.*
C. Funding: The level of funding for the overall relief opera­
tion to the Palestinians appears to be adequate for the numbers 
mentioned. In the housing sector, disbursements for the exis­
ting UNRWA program will probably not be as great as anticipated. 
Unless the level of assistance is to be increased (either the 
cash or material contribution) or unless other refugees are in­
cluded in an expanded registration and UNRWA wishes to establish 
reserves for such an eventuality, housing set-asides are more 
than sufficient. Additional funds do not need to be allocated 
for the existing program.
Levels of Expertise: As in any operation there are varying
levels of expertise and professionalism demonstrated by the 
quality and efficiency of the assistance program. The following 
is an assessment of the level of expertise demonstrated in each 
sector of activity.
1 * Planning and Camp Design. Despite UNRWA's claims to have
ample expertise and experience in camp planning, there were 
few or no demonstrated capabilities in this field. Even at 
this date, no land survey exists; no land use plan, occu­
pant tenure or ownership data has been developed; and no 
comprehensive plans for camp reconstruction or development 
have been formulated.
^Official delays and indecision regarding Palestinian tenure have not 
delayed actual reconstruction. Self-help reconstruction has proceed­
ed without regard for official or UNRWA actions and is well along 
despite hardships noted above.
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2* Engineering. Despite the lack of planning, basic engin­
eering was good. The engineering staff did a credible job 
of supervising debris removal, cleaning and re-grading, and 
terracing of specific areas. Water system installation, 
basic drainage and surfacing of roads were carried out at a 
fairly good pace with no undue problems and all should be 
completed on or about the projected schedule. Constant 
turnover of the engineering staff (most of whom were con­
tractors selected from a roster of engineers willing to 
volunteer for short-term assignments in disasters) may have 
caused some delays and certainly increased the costs. 
Resident engineers on 6-month contracts should have been 
retained.
Supervision and inspection of engineering sub-contracts by 
the UNRWA field engineer appears to have been good. No 
major cost overruns were encountered, and the higher-than- 
bid costs on most work are surprisingly low given the re­
bound of the Lebanese pound and the inflationary environ­
ment .
3* Sanitation. Expertise in sanitation is lacking. Basic
refugee camp systems were known to the field engineer but 
state-of-the-art designs/systems were not.
She1ter/Housing. No expertise was evident in this area.
3* Medical Programs. Ample expertise and experience was
evident in curative health and general medicine, although 
procedures appear to be cumbersome and may cause unneces­
sary delays. The proposed screening unit at Sidon could 
have helped in the emergency, but the need is probably past 
and the unit should not be funded.
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Despite UNRWA claims that preventative measures in support 
of health programs are being undertaken on a regular basis, 
there was little evidence of this in the camps. Most lack­
ing was participation of sanitarians and public health 
engineers.
Feeding Programs. The pre-war system of supplementary 
feeding has been retained. However, no monitoring was evi­
dent at the two centers visited (Shatila and Ayn al- 
Hilwah). Adjustments to this program and establishment of 
a local statistical analysis capability that could help the 
medical team to establish a better picture of the health 
status of the camp should be encouraged.
7. Social Services. Not observed.
Observations on the Role of UNRWA:
1. Assistance. Throughout the emergency, UNRWA has insisted 
that it should be the focal point for all assistance to 
Palestinians in the camps. In essence, this makes them 
responsible for coordination of relief efforts, the quality 
of aid, the standard of relief, and the overseeing of equi­
table distribution. Following are observations on these 
intangible aspects of the relief effort:
a. Standard of Assistance: The relief operations for
Palestinians are somewhat unique in that they are for 
refugees already living in refugee settlements. Much 
of the operation is a reconstruction effort coupled 
with reinstatement of existing services. Thus,
UNRWA's delivery of services and materials may be com­
pared with both the pre-war levels of service and the 
standard of services delivered to refugees in other
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operations. Overall, the standard of the aid and ser­
vices delivered is higher than comparable relief oper­
ations. The UNRWA staff is familiar with basic feed­
ing, medical and health programs. Thus, much of the 
effort has been devoted to restarting and expanding 
existing programs. In the medical, health and feeding 
programs, UNRWA may have been slow to respond to some 
needs but the basic standard of service was high (even 
if incredibly bureaucratic) and UNRWA has strived to 
return to pre-war levels.
In the environmental sector UNRWA's emergency response 
was quite poor. Planning was virtually non-existent; 
engineering was uncoordinated in the early stages; 
site services and housing reconstruction planning was 
never fully integrated; and contingency planning was 
non-existent. It is a credit to the engineering staff 
that they were able to accomplish so much and to pro­
ceed without more back-up; yet so much more could have 
been done with a more balanced staff. At a minimum, a 
site planner, a structural engineer and a sanitation 
engineer should have been added to the team from the 
very beginning.
b. Diversity of Assistance: Good emergency programs are
characterised by the diversity of services offered. 
Overall, most sectors of concern in the emergency re­
ceived some degree of attention. Notable exceptions 
are epidemiological monitoring and environmental sani­
tation control.
c. Degree of Sophistication: UNRWA's objectives in the
relief operations were to restore previous levels of 
service. Few of the programs seem to have made allow­
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ances for variations in the standards required by 
emergency needs. For example, supplementary feeding 
programs are generally viewed as the prime health 
monitoring and assessment vehicle in emergency opera­
tions. Supplementary feeding centers become the focal 
points for collecting and assessing health, epidemio­
logical and social welfare data, and close coordina­
tion is maintained among not only nutrition and health 
staff but also with engineering, sanitation and vector 
control personnel. This was not the case in this 
operation. Services were provided independently and 
with only informal cooperation between sectors (this 
usually at the Beirut level). In essence, services 
can be characterized as "firefighting" and sector- 
focused, rather than as a sophisticated and integrated 
attack on problems.
d. Equity of Distribution: A major task in any relief
operation is to ensure that all aid recipients receive 
assistance on an equitable basis. In the delivery of 
relief supplies, medical and nutritional services, 
UNRWA appears to have done exceedingly well. Only in 
the housing sector have there been major problems (due 
to slow replatting and assignment of available land).
Protection. UNRWA has maintained that protection of 
refugees under the terras of international law is not their 
mandate. Such a position may be legally correct but opera­
tionally every humanitarian organization has a responsibil­
ity in this effort. While direct protection may not be 
possible, indirect protection is achievable. Establishing 
a large expatriate presence in the camps to serve as de 
facto observers in order to deter incidents against the 
refugees, providing expatriates to serve as links between
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refugees and occupation authorities, and providing foreign 
staff who can stand up to economic exploitation of the 
refugees by local contractors, are all roles that UNRWA can 
play. Such indirect protective and advocacy roles have 
largely been ignored by the agency. Had a large-scale 
foreign presence been in the Beirut camps, the massacres 
might have been avoided.
Even in minor cases, UNRWA has been lacking. In Ayn al- 
Hilwah a local contractor boldly entered the camp with 
heavy equipment, claimed a portion of the land belonged to 
him, and began to excavate a large pit in the very middle 
of the camp. UNRWA failed to challenge his right to the 
land and not until a week after a 7-meter-deep, 20m x 35m 
hole had been dug did they realize that UNRWA owned the 
site.
Preparedness to Handle the Emergency. Despite affirma­
tions to the contrary, UNRWA was unprepared to handle the 
emergency operations. Most important, a trained and exper­
ienced cadre of field officers and staff was not available. 
In the past, most field work was handled by the PLO, the 
Palestinian Red Crescent, or Palestinian staff. Under the 
conditions imposed by the emergency, a new modus operandi 
was required. UNRWA should have had contingency plans for 
such an event, a small expatriate staff of technicians to 
plan and execute emergency operations, and pre-determined 
agreements with voluntary agency partners to supply emer­
gency services or materials. In this emergency UNRWA may 
be likened to an army of officers without sergeants and 
corporals to carry out the orders. With the frequency of 
such events, UNRWA should have created a small emergency 
unit and corps of reserve or on-call specialists that could 
handle field operations.
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4. Leadership and Control. Two qualities that an agency 
serving as a focal point for assistance must exhibit are 
leadership and command. In leadership, UNRWA receives fair 
marks, although it constantly had to be prodded by other 
agencies in certain sectors. In terms of command of the 
situation, UNRWA receives mixed marks. In camp development 
and reconstruction, it is obvious that no degree of control 
has been established. Unfortunately, UNRWA administrators 
failed to anticipate the need for swift and comprehensive 
land use and tenure mapping or the need to quickly develop 
camp plans. Thus, land disputes are already starting to 
occur.
5* Coordination: As lead agency, UNRWA automatically be­
comes the coordinator for humanitarian assistance to refu­
gees. In the broad sense, UNRWA performed this service 
both as host of meetings for coordinators at various levels 
and as a de facto central clearinghouse for information. 
Coordination is more than information-sharing, however, and 
in an operational sense UNRWA failed to integrate activi­
ties at the field level. Most important, UNRWA failed to 
provide a basis for coordination by conducting a detailed 
analysis of needs and matching them with services. As 
noted earlier, most aid was piecemeal, in response to needs 
as they arose.
Operational Problems of the Relief Operation in General:
!• Lack of Preparedness. As usual, few agencies were pre­
pared to handle the emergency. Few have sent experienced 
staff and many lessons have been relearned.
2. Competition Among Agencies. Competition among agencies 
was not as extensive as in past operations but rivalries
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and failure to share resources and information did hamper 
assistance to a limited extent. More harmful was UNRWA's 
attitude in public that they had the situation in control 
and could do everything. This was clearly not the case.
3. Overemphasis on Medical Aid. Emergency medical aid and
curative medicine is normally a short-lived need, yet most 
agencies have continued to provide these services far be­
yond the normal time. Preventive medicine and public 
health measures have not received the emphasis required 
either by UNRWA or the volags. Rehabilitation therapy and 
crisis counseling have also received less attention. In 
general, the clear emphasis has been on medical aid to the 
detriment of a balanced relief program.
Welfare Mentality. It has been the policy of the relief 
agencies to provide all services completely free of charge. 
A small percentage of refugees have been employed by relief 
agencies but most are recipients of continuous gifts. Even 
before the war, a kind of Palestinian welfare state existed 
and it appears that a return to the old system is being en­
couraged; While it is recognized that many of the services 
normally provided are similar to those provided in many 
European countries, it could be argued that the extent of 
these services is extravagant beyond certain points. For 
example, current plans are to continue supplementary feed­
ing programs for all children under five indefinitely. 
Feeding may be required for selected cases but, as long as 
basic rations are sufficient, certainly not universal sup­
plemental feeding.
Another concern in this regard is the lack of sophistica­
tion in distributing supplies and services. Agencies 
simply give everything away. This means there is no incen­
4.
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tive for people to do things collectively in the camps. 
While some items should be donated, work programs should be 
established in conjunction with distribution of major items 
and services .
5. Monitoring and Assessment. Initial assessments of damage 
and needs were relatively superficial and did not provide 
program planners with data upon which to plan projects. 
While the general data provided was helpful to indicate 
general sectors of need, numerous agencies reported that it 
was necessary to conduct their own assessments in order to 
develop the data for their planning needs.
Data collection for monitoring the program has recently 
been reestablished, although statistical analysis in health 
and nutrition is conducted in Vienna and is reportedly not 
returned to Beirut.
Communications. The Government of Lebanon has prevented 
establishment of an electronic communications (radio) net­
work. This has caused numerous delays and problems in co­
ordination. (An interagency courier service could have 
been established, however).
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SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN THE CAMPS
Land allocation is the most critical issue in the big southern 
camps at this time. Due to lack of planning and control, it is esti­
mated that between 10%—15% of the people currently in the heavily 
devastated camps will not receive land when it is reapportioned.
Added to this is the fact that, in Sidon, 30% of the land used by 
Palestinians before the war was illegally occupied and is currently 
being reclaimed by the Lebanese (with assistance from the Israelis). 
Furthermore, there are reports that some people from Tyre are moving 
to Ayn al-Hilwah. If others return as expected, the problem will 
become even more critical.
Site Planning and Land Allocation: Comprehensive site plan­
ning is required whenever land is to be reapportioned or when 
clearance activities are of such an extent as to erase normal 
boundary markers. In three camps (Ayn al-Hilwah, Rashidiyah and 
Burj ash-Shamali) extensive grading took place, and in two (Ayn 
Hilwah and Burj ash—Shamali) the basic land contours were 
changed in various parts of the camp. In these areas, land was 
replatted and is being reapportioned. Yet until December no 
site planning was carried out.
1 * Land Surveys. The engineering staff complained that land 
ownership data was not provided until late in the program. 
This information in the form of both legal descriptions and 
maps should have been the first data provided to the engi­
neers .* Aerial photos of the post-disaster sites would 
also have been useful but for political reasons these could 
not be obtained in IDF-controlled areas. In this case,
^Engineers noted that the maps that were provided were inaccurate.
ground surveys should have been carried out as the first 
step and periodically revised as changes were made. These 
would have served as a basis for reapportioning land and 
developing estimates of space available for housing and 
other facilities.
2. Cadastral Surveys. When dealing with land issues, it is 
important to know land use, land tenure patterns, ownership 
boundaries, and location of buildings before and after the 
damage. This data is usually developed and presented in 
the form of a map. It is from this map and the topographic 
data that any changes in the camp design, land use or 
tenure patterns are made.
3. Camp Designs/Redesign. In most camps redesign was simply 
not possible nor desirable. The best approach was to treat 
the situation as a reconstruction program, and this is what 
UNRWA did. In two cases (Ayn al-Hilwah and Burj ash- 
Shamali) grading and filling necessitated some reapportion­
ment of the land and did require some replatting. In 
Rashidiyah, large-scale clearance also required replatting. 
In all these cases, there was an opportunity to do some in­
novative design work, but UNRWA elected to do simple 
"straight line" layouts and not to alter the basic layout 
of the camps. In retrospect, while not innovative, the de­
cisions in each case cannot be faulted.
Replatting. In the graded areas, it was necessary to re­
plat the land so that it could be reapportioned. The major 
concern was to ensure equitable distribution of the remain­
ing land area. The cleared land was divided into parcels*
approximately 100m *. The staff did not seem to consider 
prior land uses in the replatting, nor were allowances made 
for assignment or development of sites in prime locations. 
For example, sites at intersections of major roads would be 
ideal for small stores and service centers. Yet these are 
often the smallest land areas and are noted on the map with 
the same classification as the other sites.
5. Reassignment of the Land. The task of reapportioning the 
land was given to a committee of school teachers who re-
2
Figure 2: Teacher Redistributing Land in Ayn al-Hilwah
*An UNRWA standard agreed upon in the 1969 Cairo Agreement. In this 
Agreement, responsibility for assisting all Palestinians in camps was 
turned over to the PLO. Under the terms of the agreement, UNRWA was 
to continue to serve as the U.N. and international coordinator for 
donors but to turn operational responsibility and control of assis­
tance over to Palestinians.
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ceived no instructions other than to do it as fairly as 
possible and to see that large families received the lar­
gest plots. Most have tried to put people back where they 
were before the war; however, the recontouring, grading and 
replatting have made this difficult. Realization that land 
boundaries were no longer recognizable led many refugees to 
amplify their chosen site as soon as it was cleared and be­
fore reapportioning commenced. In Ayn al-Hilwah over half 
of the land was taken before UNRWA could begin reapportion­
ment. In practical terms, this means that a few families 
control the larger and best sites and the rest will have to 
accept smaller plots on the remaining land. In operational 
terms, this means UNRWA has lost control of the site's 
development. This will cause problems in the future and 
could have been anticipated. It is the most important rea­
son for UNRWA to have had camp planners working with the 
engineering team from the beginning. Land disputes can be 
expected to be a major problem. It should be remembered 
that most reapportionment is taking place in the absence of 
large numbers of heads-of-household. When these men re- 
return, land disputes may become even more serious.
Figure 3: Example of Uncontrolled Expansion of a Site
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6 . Land Apportionment Standard. In the reassignment of
land, UNRWA has attempted to give each family approximately
2100m of land. In normal times, this standard would be 
quite reasonable; however, given the need to find room for 
more people on less land, the standard could have been re­
duced without too much hardship on the Palestinians and 
more space would have been available. For example, in Ayn
al-Hilwah a reduction of the standard by 20% (from 100m2 
2to 80m ) would probably have enabled UNRWA to accomodate 
most of the people whom the present distribution will not 
cover. Again, had this been done from the outset, land 
would not be as critical an issue as it will be.
B. Site Clearance:
1. Status. Almost all site clearance activities in the
camps have been completed and regrading has virtually end­
ed. No problems other than those mentioned in earlier 
reports were encountered. Demolition and filling of
Figure 4: Family Holding Land on a Regraded Site in Ayn al-Hilwah
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damaged air raid shelters proceeded much faster than ori­
ginally expected. UNRWA engineers should be cited for 
bringing this activity to a close as quickly as they did 
and far under budget.
2• Other Comments. UNRWA engineers noted that clearance was
facilitated by assignment of John Pedigo, Brown & Root, who 
helped develop methodology and selected contractors for 
clearance.
C . Water Supply;
Status. UNRWA engineers have reconnected or reinstalled 
most of the water mains and laterals. In the more heavily 
damaged camps in the south, new systems had to be installed 
in large areas of the camps.
2• Problems. The people in the camps had direct supply to
their houses before the war. The new systems in the south­
ern camps supply water to scattered water points. There 
has been some vandalism of water points and washstands due 
to (a) resentment that water is not being piped to each 
house site; (b) the fact that water points were placed on 
land previously occupied and owners want the land back; and 
(c) some neighboring families want water points moved away 
from their hous-es to reduce mud and runoff that gets onto 
their land, and to reduce noise and trespassing. These 
problems are minor and will sort themselves out; however, 
better design of the facilities and better siting would 
have reduced the problems. NOTE: The system cannot be ex­
panded at a later date to add direct supply to houses due 
to low capacity and head in 3/4" pipes. For service to
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houses, new lines will have to be installed.
Figure 5: A Water Point in Use
D . Sanitation:
1. Status. There are currently no plans to provide latrines 
or sanitation units. In normal times each family dug its 
own pit latrine. The soils in most areas do not allow for 
much filtration and, when the pits fill with liquids, the 
overflow drains outside the house and into the storm 
drains, most of which are open box culverts in the center 
of pathways or in the streets. When solids fill the pit, 
it has to be pumped, dug out, or closed. In many areas, 
sewage has penetrated outside the latrines causing unsani­
tary conditions. In camp areas that have been filled and 
where soils have not been compacted, this problem may be
21
expected to increase.
Figure 6: Latrine Drainpipe Emptying into Storm Drain
Recommendations. A simple system that would be compati­
ble with the usual method adopted by the refugees is the 
"aqua privy". These are large, round concrete or fiber­
glass containers that are placed in the ground. Each has 
one or two squatting plates on top which drain into a pipe 
that extends down into the middle of the tank. Two addi­
tional pipes are installed at the top of the tank. One 
bleeds methane gas out the top and the other serves as an 
overflow. The -overflow collects liquid waste from a rela­
tively safe area of the tank and drains it outside. On a 
temporary basis, this liquid can be drained into the storm 
drain without too much danger; but later small pipes can be 
installed to collect and drain the outfall and carry it to 
a safe disposal or treatment area. The solids in the aqua 
privy will eventually have to be removed. Frequency of de- 
sludging depends on the size of the units, but some can
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FAMILY-TYPE A Q U A  PRIVY USING 90-CM- OR 120-CM- (3-FT- OR 4-FT-) DIAMETER 
CONCRETE SEWER PIPE FOR THE TANK
Measurements shown are in centimetres.
A => Outlet to soakage trench or soakage pit 
B =  Removable, reinforced concrete cover slab 
C ■= 2.5-cm- (1-in.-) diameter pipe ventilation
D «= Tank capacity varies with diameter and length of sewer pipe used
E =  90-cm- or 120-cm- (3-ft- or 4-ft-) diameter concrete sewer pipe, 90 cm (3 ft) long or more 
sealed with concrete at lower end
Figure 7: Aqua Privy
(Source: E.G. Wagner and J.N. Lanoix, Excreta Disposal for Rural 
Areas and Small Communities, World Health Organization, Geneva, 
1958, p .  83.)
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safely be used for a year or more if the size is large 
enough. It is highly recommended that such a system be 
considered.
E. Waste Collection and Disposal:
1• Status and Usual Method. Refuse collection is a minor
problem that could pose a health hazard as more people re­
turn to the camps. At present rubbish is simply dumped in 
the streets and collected by a team with shovels and wheel­
barrows. This is the way it is done in normal times as 
well. The engineering staff has proposed placing garbage 
barrels at key locations throughout the camps, but previous 
experience indicates that they will be taken by the refu­
gees .
Recomendation. In other situations, use of garbage bar­
rels has also proven unworkable. A better system, and one 
that coincides with existing practice, is to issue plastic 
garbage bags to refugees. The system will work as usual, 
but at least the garbage will not be scattered. The bags 
are not expensive and, if they are issued free of cost for 
six months, it should encourage people to use the method 
and, when they have their own incomes back, they should 
continue this system at their own expense.
F. Housing and Shelter:
Status of the Refugees. All refugees have shelter. Many 
are living in schools, with relatives, in partially damaged 
buildings, or in newly-built temporary shelters or recon­
structed houses. No one is in the open. (See shelter 
photos on following page.)
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Figure 10:
New and Repaired 
Houses (Ayn al- 
Hilwah)
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Self-help reconstruction efforts by the refugees are out­
pacing the efforts of UNRWA. Some reconstruction is al­
ready complete, aided in part by contributions from family 
and friends overseas. Reports that the PLO is channelling 
large amounts directly to the people are exaggerated, but 
there is no doubt that some people have received support 
indirectly from PLO supporters.
The level and pace of reconstruction seems to have sur­
prised UNRWA but in fact, if more men were present, most of 
the camps would probably have been rebuilt by now. In the 
consultant's opinion, UNRWA has shown little initiative or 
leadership on this issue. In part this is due to political 
reasons, especially the question of whether or not the 
Palestinians would be allowed to remain and, if so, which 
ones the original refugees and dependents from 1948 only 
or those from 1967 and 1970 also. Not wanting to antago­
nize the Government of Lebanon, UNRWA has maintained a fic­
tion that they are only providing temporary shelter 
(tents). Rather than advocating a more realistic policy or 
examining closely other shelter methods which could have 
contributed to permanent reconstruction when permission was 
given, UNRWA has opted for a costly ruse of providing tents 
(imported from Pakistan), bases of tiles to set them on, 
and a block wall approximately 60cm. high to provide "pro­
tection". UNRWA argued that, if long-term permission to 
remain was given, the partial structures could be converted 
to permanent buildings. The problems are:
--  the people did not want tents;
block walls require foundations.
Thus the few tents erected were quickly torn down by the
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refugees.
Figure 11: Abandoned, Destroyed Tent Bases (Ayn al-Hilwah)
2. Current Housing & Shelter Program of UNRWA. The current 
plan is to provide a combination of materials and cash to 
each family for rebuilding, plus one tent, according to the 
following allocation and schedule:
Phase I: Phase I is designed to provide funds and mater­
ials to people whose houses were damaged beyond repair and 
who are totally, without a house of their own now. There 
are two parts. Part A is for refugees living in the camps* 
now and generally is for those who were considered resi-
*The term "in camps" used here refers to people living on land 
legally dedicated to UNRWA by the Government of Lebanon.
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dents of the camp before the war. In the south (Sidon and 
Tyre) people will receive a cash allotment based on the 
size of their family according to the following formula:
1-6 people: 2000££ (3000££ proposed by UNRWA/Vienna)
7-12 people: 4000££ (6000££ proposed by UNRWA/Vienna)
13+ people: 6000££ (9000££ proposed by UNRWA/Vienna)
In addition, people who are reassigned land must agree to 
accept a tent.
In Beirut, building materials will be provided in lieu of 
cash. People will be interviewed to determine their needs 
and will be eligible for up to 1000 cement blocks, 26 zinc- 
laminated roofing sheets, 20 wooden roof beams, and 20 bags 
of cement, depending on family size and other factors. 
(There is no tent requirement in Beirut.) Both the amount 
of materials and the equivalent value of the materials were 
determined by estimating the amount of materials required 
to build a small two-room cement block house with 28m2 
floor space. The hypothetical structure or "design" would 
have a roof made of corrugated metal sheets laminated with 
zinc. The price does not include windows, doors, or win- 
dow/door frames.
Eligibility for,Part A will be determined on the basis of a 
survey conducted immediately after the war. Notices were 
posted around the camps instructing the refugees to go to a 
central place in each camp and register their losses with 
the school teachers. People were asked to describe their 
housing losses as "totally destroyed", "partially destroy­
ed , or minor damage". There was no verification except 
that the school teachers, being residents of the camps
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themselves, often knew the people and could detect exagger­
ated claims. However, in the south many people appear to 
have actually underestimated their damages, while in 
Beirut damages were usually overestimated.*
UNRWA estimates that 3,900 families will require Phase I-A 
assistance in the south. This number was derived by esti­
mate based on the following: In a survey conducted in July
and August, 55,000 people were listed as homeless in the 
south (36,000 in Tyre and 19,000 in Sidon). This number 
was divided by an average family size of 5.7 to get an 
estimated 10,000 families. From experience, UNRWA esti­
mated the ratio of camp residents to those living outside 
camps to be 50/50/ (or 5000/5000). For planning purposes, 
an estimate of in-camp families who lost homes and would be 
eligible for Phase I assistance was placed at 65% of in­
camp residents, thus making approximately 3,900 families in 
the south. After two weeks of cash disbursements, the 
average grant was 2900££ per family. For planning pur­
poses, UNRWA raised this to 3000££.
Thus UNRWA now projects a total cost of US$2,960,000 for 
Phase I-A grants in the south. In Beirut UNRWA estimates 
that 365 families will be eligible for Phase I-A materials 
and that the program will cost US$280,000. The total cost 
of Phase I-A is.estimated to be US$3,240,000.
Part A has already commenced and over half the people eli­
gible to be served in the south have been served.
*Source: Camp service officers
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Part B of Phase I is a proposed program to provide assis­
tance to people living outside the camps. At the present 
time, the Lebanese Government is opposed to the provision 
of assistance to people outside the camps since often they 
occupy land illegally. However, large numbers of people 
outside the camps are now homeless and have lost substan­
tial investments in their structures and belongings. Thus 
UNRWA proposes to provide these people a cash grant of 
2000££ to replace belongings lost in the war. It is 
privately recognized that much of this money would be used 
to replace or repair damaged buildings.
If the program were to be approved, UNRWA would disburse 
the cash on the basis of individual surveys. (Not all of 
these people were included in the teachers' survey conduc­
ted after the war.)
UNRWA estimates that approximately 3,500 families would be 
eligible for Phase I-B funds, for an estimated 1.8 million 
US dollars .
Phase II: To help families with damaged houses, UNRWA
proposes to give grants of 2000££ to each family living 
in camps that claimed a damaged house in the teachers' 
survey. In the south, an estimated 2,340 will be eligible; 
in Beirut, surveys have determined approximately 775 people 
will be eligible. UNRWA estimates a total Phase II budget 
of approximately 2.3 million US dollars (1.19 million for 
the south; approximately $400,000 for Beirut). In the 
south, cash will be by grant. In Beirut, disbursements 
will be by individual survey and adjusted accordingly to a 
maximum of 2000££.
30
Phase III: To help families who have already rebuilt
their houses without waiting for assistance, UNRWA proposes 
to provide a cash grant of 1250££ to people living in 
camps. The total of estimated recipients in the south is 
260 families, for an estimated cost of US$132,000. Esti­
mates of those eligible in Beirut were not available at the 
time of this report.
3. Additional Assistance to Refugees in Need of Housing. A 
few additional offers of financial and material assistance 
have been made. The Islamic Foundation has offerred to 
provide matching funds to refugees in Sidon. For each 
family eligible for the 6000££ cash grant from UNRWA, the 
Foundation will provide 2500££; families eligible for 
4000££ will receive 2000££; and those eligible for 
2000££ will receive 1500££.
UNRWA has also stated that Save the Children (UK) and World 
Vision have offered to assist. SCF will provide doors and 
windows for houses in Burj al-Barajinah, and World Vision 
will provide the same for new houses in Sabra/Shatila.
4. Observations on UNRWA Shelter Assistance Package. The 
basic idea of providing cash and/or building materials can­
not be faulted. The idea is sound and, since most families 
have experience- with building, it is the most convenient 
way to support reconstruction. However, it would have 
made more sense to start with what UNRWA is calling Phase 
II. Since this is overall a reconstruction program, money 
to stimulate repair should have gone out first (or at least 
at the same time as money for new construction). This 
would have helped get people re-established, promoted acti­
vity in the camps, and increased the available shelter in 
the camps.
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Second, UNRWA took a long time to adopt and develop this 
approach. Surely this could have been part of a general 
preparedness or contingency plan.
Third, it appears that no effort is being made to help peo­
ple maximize their purchasing power. UNRWA simply disbur­
ses the funds. The result will be that individual families 
will have to buy in an inflationary market. By either pur­
chasing in bulk and re-selling at cost, or by assisting as 
an intermediary, the costs could be brought down. (The 
system used in Beirut of giving out materials in lieu of 
cash will serve this same purpose, although the system used 
in the south is preferable as it allows the refugees more 
flexibility.)
Fourth, UNRWA is providing no technical or engineering 
assistance directly to the refugees. Most repair and re­
construction to date is of a very poor standard. Some con- 
constructions are unsafe. UNRWA should provide a team of 
architects, engineers and construction journeymen to advise 
builders on low-cost methods to improve buildings and to 
demonstrate safe ways to cut costs.
Finally, the fact that people that have already rebuilt are 
receiving the smallest allotment seems to be penalizing 
those with initiative.
5. Structural Problems Likely to be Encountered.
a. Differential Settling: Since many houses are built on
uncompacted fill, some degree of differential settling 
can be expected. This will have only minor effect on 
single-story buildings, but two- and three-story 
structures may experience more critical structural
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Figure 12: Clearing an Entrance to a Repaired House (Ayn al-Hilwah).
Note the height of the road and regraded land adjacent to the house.
Foundations: Few newly—reconstructed buildings have
deep foundations due to the people's reluctance to dig 
down into the ground for fear of finding unexploded 
bombs. Lack of good foundations may have an effect on 
the safety of new multiple-story buildings because the 
foundation may not be strong enough to hold them. As 
the filled areas settle, buildings may rock and be 
damaged.
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o Summary of Useful Figures from Housing Program (from UNRWA).
a. Number of people in need of shelter: 94,796 (Source: 
survey).
b. Number of families in need of shelter: 17,000 (based 
on dividing total number of people by 5.7, the average 
size of a Palestinian family).
c. Number of families currently in camps in Beirut and 
south: 14,161
d. Number of families currently outside of camps: 15,000
e. Number of families estimated to participate in:
Phase I-A........4,265
Phase I-B........3,500
Phase I I ....... 3,115
Phase III........  325 (estimate by consultant)
f. Estimated average grant per family for:
Phase I-A........2900££
Phase I-B....... 2000££
Phase I I ....... 2000££
Phase III.' . . . . 1250££
. 2g. Estimated number of blocks to build a 28m house:
1,000
Oh. Average size of lot apportioned by UNRWA: +87m
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G. Drainage:
Status. Most storm drains, culverts and gutters were re­
placed or rebuilt in the regrading of the camps. There are 
no major problems at present, although settling of roads in 
the next few months may necessitate repairs next spring.
2. Recommendation. Set aside funds for minor repairs.
H. Schools: Most schools that are still standing are being used
for shelter or other purposes. When they are vacated, some re­
habilitation work will be required.
UNRWA engineers have done their best to try to save existing 
facilities, repairing some structures that in other situations 
would have been written off. They should be cited for their in­
sistence on repair for it will save the program millions of dol­
lars. UNRWA may want to consider having the repairs checked by 
a structural engineer since this is an earthquake zone and the 
buildings are frequently occupied to capacity.
Clinics, Hospitals, Supplementary Feeding Centers: Most medi­
cal facilities received repairable damage. To date, UNRWA has 
attempted to repair as many facilities in the camps as possible. 
In Ayn al-llilwah the main clinic was heavily damaged and lost 
one wing, but the remainder has been successfully repaired.
The hospital on the eastern border of Ayn al-Hilwah has been the 
subject of some debate. UNICEF has proposed building a new hos­
pital, while others suggest repairing the existing facility.
The damage is only to non-load-bearing walls on the exterior.
The frame and columns appear intact, the foundation is sound,
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and most interior walls only need to have smoke marks washed 
off. Even extensive interior redesign would be economically 
feasible .
Figure 13: Hospital in Sidon Adjacent to Ayn al-Hilwah
J• Circulation Systems:
1. Status. All roads have been regraded where necessary and 
many have been resurfaced with rock and gravel.
2* Future Plans. After the rainy season there are plans to
resurface all roads with asphalt. There is some criticism 
of this as being too extravagant, but it will help keep the 
camps clean, keep drainage from undermining the buildings, 
and reduce settling problems. If no action is taken on in­
stalling sanitation systems, then hard-surfaced streets and
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paths will be absolutely necessary to keep waste water 
moving out of the camp. (Earth or gravel roads and paths 
wi11 encourage water to pond j and drains will be constantly 
clogged with debris and rocks.)
K . Light and Power:
!• Status. Electrical systems in most southern camps will
have to be replaced entirely. In some camps, especially in 
Beirut, electricity should be available soon, but there are 
unconfirmed reports that the municipality will not recon­
nect the system.
2. Recommendation. For security purposes, it is important 
to provide as much light as possible to the camps. The 
Government of Lebanon should be asked to restore electri­
city as soon as possible. As an interim solution, Coleman- 
style lanterns should be donated to each household.
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SUMMARY OF MAJOR OBSERVATIONS
Major Issues in the Camps
A. Land: Due to mismanagement and lack of planning, there will
be a shortage of land in several camps. In Ayn al-Hilwah, 10% - 
15% of the people there now will not have land assigned to them. 
If other families return, the situation will become critical.
B* Security: UNRWA is gradually withdrawing its foreign staff in
the camps. The lack of a substantial foreign presence to serve 
as observers unsettles the refugees and could lead to increased 
exploitation by outsiders, especially in camps "protected" by 
DFF (Haddad). Lack of security will necessarily lead people to 
seek reinstatement of PLO or PLO-like organizations for secur­
ity. A large expatriate presence may also inhibit the PLO from 
making an overt early return to camps.
Housing: Most refugees believe the UNRWA housing program is
too little and very late. People whose houses were totally des­
troyed and who lived on land that was cleared and replatted 
resent having to relocate even if only by a few feet. They feel 
they have been doubly hurt once by the bombing, and once by 
UNRWA.
Future Political Issues
A * Equity Between Palestinians and Lebanese: The Lebanese public
and government are becoming resentful of the high level of at­
tention given to the needs of the Palestinians, The high stan- 
ard of service to Palestinians before the war was much resented
: , ; : ' ■ ■ I ' . | . 1 ' I ; , , ,
then and this feeling is not likely to decrease. The U.S. 
should encourage a general reduction in some of the services and
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As a result of this experience, UNRWA should be encouraged to 
conduct a detailed evaluation and use the findings to develop organi­
zational changes to help better prepare for emergency operations. An 
Emergencies Unit should be established and emergency procedures pre­
pared. The unit should be made up of operational field people, and 
standing arrangements for working with operational partners should be 
made.
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